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A misleading campaign organized by the extreme right managed in the span of just 10 hours—the
time allotted for an Oct. 2 plebiscite in which barely a third of eligible voters participated—to thwart
what had taken the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC) 45 painstaking months to accomplish: a comprehensive peace deal, signed Sept. 26, that
looked to end 52 years of brutal civil war.
Does the “No” vote in the peace-deal referendum mean that Colombia is an antidemocratic, war
loving country? Not likely. In Uruguay, a demonstrably democratic country with plenty of plebiscite
experience, people came to the conclusion some time ago that major conceptual issues, matters that
are almost philosophical in nature, shouldn’t be submitted to a simple “Yes” or “No” vote (NotiSur,
Nov. 6, 2009). The situation in Colombia, instead, raises a different question: Did it really make sense
to hold a referendum on an accord that had been signed just six days earlier, without taking the time
to properly educate people about the contents of the deal? The journalist Stella Calloni argued in the
Brazilian online magazine Diálogos do Sul that the answer, as the Uruguayans concluded earlier, is
no.
Colombians continue to pursue peace despite the “No” result. On Oct. 10, eight days after the
referendum, the government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the Ejército de Liberación
Nacional (ELN), the country’s second largest guerrilla force after the FARC, announced in
Venezuela that they would begin official peace talks on Oct. 27 in Quito, Ecuador. The two sides
had already been engaged in secret negotiations. Before the announcement, the ELN agreed to
government demands that it turn kidnapped civilian captives over to the International Committee of
the Red Cross. “Now that we’re moving forward with the ELN, it will be a complete peace,” Santos
said. Ecuador is one of the countries—along with Venezuela, Norway, Chile, Cuba, and Brazil—that
helped oversee the unofficial phase of the government-ELN negotiations.

Minuscule margin
Of the 34.9 million people eligible to vote, only 36.7%—far less than the normal election average of
more than 50%—participated in the Oct. 2 referendum. The “No” option won, but with support from
just 18.43% of the eligible voting population, versus 18.27% who chose “Yes.” The other 63.3% of
eligible voters didn’t even take part in the transcendent decision.
“One has to really think about that: Less than one in five people voted against the peace deal,” said
Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa in his first reaction to the plebiscite, which captivated the entire
region of Latin America like no other vote before it.
The voting margin was so narrow that it makes the “No” victory—just as it would have been for
“Yes” had the results been reversed—more of a numerical issue than a political fact. President
Santos had said before the referendum that a strong “Yes” showing was needed to consolidate
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peace. But the same could be said for the “No.” The 0.16% difference between the two sides is little
more than a statistical anecdote.
Still, it was enough to throw Colombia back into a situation it had worked hard to overcome, one as
complicated, perhaps, as the scenario that existed before November 2012, when the government and
the FARC first met publicly for peace talks in Havana, Cuba. The sides had been meeting for two
years before that, but in secret, in Oslo, Norway.

Uncertain outlook
On Oct. 3, a Monday, negotiators returned to Cuba to “think out loud about what took place,” as
FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño, better known as Timochenko, said. On Tuesday, after putting it
to a vote, the rebel group ordered its combatants to return to the safety of their jungle bases. On
Wednesday, Santos met with representatives of the “No” faction, headed by former President
Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010).
Two days after that, Santos was back in the news when the Norwegian Nobel Committee, in Oslo,
honored him with its prestigious Peace Prize. Santos characterized the award as “a mandate from
the international community to forge ahead with the accord with the guerrillas, and as a tribute
to the victims.” The decision was celebrated across the globe. Some observers were surprised and
disappointed, nevertheless, that the Nobel committee—as it has done on a number of previous
occasions—didn’t also extend the honor to the other side of the peace process, the FARC, in this
case.
Uribe and his followers, whom people in the “Yes” camp accuse of being “crazy war mongers,”
continue, in the meantime, to work against peace efforts. After mounting a campaign peppered
with lies—they said, for example, that that the government would cut pension payments by 7% to
finance demobilized rebels, and that Santos had made a pact to hold fraudulent elections so as to
assure Timochenko the presidency—Uribe is now demanding concessions that the guerrillas will
never agree too. One is that the transitional justice system designed to operate after the conflict be
scrapped, and that the rebels, therefore, hand over their weapons in exchange for nothing, which
essentially means in exchange for jail.
“Future talks are going to be difficult, especially for Uribe,” said Foreign Affairs Minister María
Ángela Holguín, one of the government’s official negotiators. “There were some formidable
agreements reached with the FARC. To go from that to demanding they lay down their arms and go
to jail just seems to me like a provocation.”

Financing and fraud
On Oct. 6, Juan Carlos Vélez, a former senator and the political and financial point man on the “No”
campaign designed by Uribe’s extreme-right Centro Democrático (CD) party, made a revelation that
caught the public by surprise and irritated his political boss. In a radio interview, Vélez divulged
the names of companies that financed the “No” campaign and admitted that the strategy he and his
colleagues used was based on lies and meant to provoke indignation among voters. Uribe has since
urged Vélez to leave the CD.
“The admission by the head of the CD campaign that they lied to voters is proof that there was
fraud,” said Sen. Claudia López of the Alianza Verde. Lawyers with the party accuse Uribe of direct
involvement in the scheme and insist that his actions, as well as those of Vélez, constitute a crime
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(electoral fraud) that is punishable, according to the penal code, by between four and eight years in
prison.
The revelations also sparked a wave of criticism against the businesses Vélez identified as having
funded the pro-war campaign. The list includes the radio and television conglomerate RCN and
multinationals like the Dutch brewing company Heineken, the British motor oil company Castrol,
and Foton, an affiliate of the state-owned Chinese automaker Beiqi Foton Motor Co.

Missed opportunity
Holguín said that the “No” victory also raises doubts in the international arena, specifically with
regards to the many organizations and entities—ranging from the UN to the European Union, the
Vatican and fellow Latin American governments—that had promised to help Colombia navigate
its post-conflict future. The minister noted, for example, that EU cooperation funds have already
been frozen. She also said that while the UN mission will remain in Colombia to observe the current
ceasefire, its presence will not be indefinite given that its mandate, as defined by the Security
Council, is to “verify the peace agreement,” which in practical terms no longer exists.
The same goes for efforts to clear parts of the country from land mines, a complicated task being
carried out jointly by the government and the FARC under the supervision of international experts
(NotiSur, April 3, 2015). The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Red Cross, for their
part, will keep their respective teams in Colombia, though it’s unclear whether they will continue to
receive the underage guerrillas who had begun to demobilize.
The civil war began in 1964 when, under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda, the FARC first
took up weapons in the tropical grasslands of Yarí, the same territory in southeastern Colombia in
which the rebels, days before the peace accord was signed, held what was supposed to be their last
gathering as an armed group. The peace deal, reached 52 years later, promised to do away with the
guerrilla group and replace it with a new political party.
The conflict resulted in some 280,000 deaths and 45,000 disappearances, left thousands mutilated,
displaced 7 million people and forced hundreds of thousands into exile. Over the course of that
bloody war, three attempts were made to negotiate a peace settlement. But it wasn’t until November
2012, with the governments of Cuba and Norway acting as guarantors, and Chile and Venezuela in
an accompanying role, that hopes of ending the conflict finally began to take shape (NotiSur, Dec.
14, 2012).
On Aug. 24, in Havana, negotiators signed a pre-accord. Finally, on Sept. 26, in the Colombian city
of Cartagena, Santos and Timochenko sealed the deal on a 297-page document—translated, for the
plebiscite, into 62 of the country’s 65 native languages—that spells out in detail the various items
in their carefully negotiated agreement. Chief among those are issues regarding land ownership
—one of the original causes of the war—and guarantees for the safe reinsertion of guerrillas into
mainstream politics (NotiSur, July 15, 2016).
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